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AERONAUTIC RISK EXCLUSION IN LIFE
INSURANCE CONTRACTS*
FRED M.

I.

GLASSt

INTRODUCTION.

Since its advent into the field of private and commercial travel,
aviation has presented an ever changing problem to those interested
in life insurance.1 Though the revolutionary developments in both
the art and mechanics of flying have been reflected in corresponding
* This is the first installment of a thesis submitted to the faculty of Northwestern University School of Law in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Laws.
The author's preface reads, in part, as follows: "Hand in hand with the
phenomenal development of aviation during the last decade and its general
acceptance by the public as a commercial mode of transportation, has been a
marked numerical increase in the fatalities resulting from aeronautical flight.
The fact that the lives of a large percentage of those meeting death in plane
casualty were insured for varying amounts by policies which in themselves
contained provisions excluding aeronautic risk from coverage, has, of necessity
made the problem of the judicial interpretation of these aeronautical risk
exclusions one of major importance to 'both the insured and the insurer.
The diametrically opposed decisions, which mark the result to date of
litigation interpreting these exclusions, have resulted in the necessary classification of any prediction as to the validity or non-validity of any particular exception as nothing more than conjecture. Faced, under these conditions, not
only with the problem of ascertaining liability under policies now in effect, but
also of phrasing aeronautical clauses In policies currently issued in such a
manner as to conclusively and precisely state the exact risk covered and the
risk excepted, the topic is one of ever-increasing interest to insurers. It was on
the recommendation of this topic by several outstanding men in the legal phase
of life insurance as one of great Importance and timeliness, and In need of
thorough research and presentment, that this study was begun.
The chief sources of information have been the reported cases, and policy
contracts written by American and Canadian Life Insurance Companies from
1912 to 1936. The author ,wishes, however, to acknowledge his indebtedness
to the legal departments of a number of insurance companies, particularly the
Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, The Travelers Insurance Company, Aero Insurance Underwriters, and the Equitable Life Assurance Society
of the United States. Helpful suggestions have also been made by Prof. Harold
C. Havighurst and Prof. Fred D. Fagg, Jr. of the Northwestern University
School of Law. Mr. Ralph H. Rastner, Mr. Maurice E. Benson. and Miss Mildred Hammond of the American Life Convention, Mr. Henry Minor Faser. Jr.,
of the Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, and Mr. J. E. Hoskins of the
Travelers Insurance Company.
t Graduate student, Northwestern University School of Law, 1935-36.
1. See Leonard Axe, Aviation Insurance (1931) p. 7: "The development
and progress of aviation Insurance is a story of the struggle of Insurance
underwriters to cope with a new Insurance problem."
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liberalization of risk coverage by underwriters,2 these same developments have led to a great increase in aviation's acceptance by the
general public 3-a policy holding public-and made the problem one
of immediate concern to the insurer.4
The ineffectiveness of the policy provisions generally used to
protect insurers from liability for death resulting from aerial flight
was early demonstrated in a decision,5 during 1910, wherein the
court refused to recognize the broad "hazardous occupation" clause"
as a defense to liability in the fatal injury of an insured railroad
employee, sustained by him as the result of a single balloon ascension. Not only did the more or less standard provisions fail to
protect the insurer against aeronautical risks in a satisfactory manner, but the widely used contract provisions for double indemnity in
cases of insured's accidental death while riding in a common carrier,7 obviously needed only a judicial determination of an airplane
as being included in such a category to expose the insurer to even
this additional liability. Inconsistent decisions as to such queston in
relation to private planes carrying passengers for hire,8 and nu2. See infra, Part V. (To be published in the October issue).
3. Indicative of the marked growth in the use of aviation as a means of
transportation, are the following figures as to commercial air lines operating
in the United States during the last seven years, compiled from statistics published by the United States Department of Commerce, in the Air Commerce
Bulletin:
PassengerMiles
Year
PassengersCarried
Miles Flown
Flown
1929
173,405
25,141,499
1930
374,935
31,992,634
83,359,705
1931
468,981
42,868,922
106,442,375
1932
474.279
45,606,354
127,038,797
1933
493,141
48,771,553
173,492,119
1934
561.370
50,506,470
225,267,559
1935
746,946
55,380;353
313,905,508
The statistics of this same department show that from July to December,
1935. the accident rate was 1,054,882 miles per accident.
4. "The subject (life Insurance aviation risks) is one which has been
widely discussed this year and will become of still greater Importance as air
travel becomes a more accepted means of business occupation."
The Eastern
Underwriter,'Fri., Dec. 6, 1935, p. 1.
5. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. Van Fleet, 47 Col. 401, 107 P.
1087, 14 A L. R. 986 (1910).
6. Typical of such provisions is the one involved in the Pacific Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Van Fleet case (ibid) : "while following any occupation or in any
exposure or performing acts parallel in hazard to the characteristic acts of any
occupation classed by' the company as more hazardous than is specified in the
application for this policy, the principal sum and weekly indemnity shall be for
such amount as the premiums paid will purchase at the rates fixed for such
more hazardous occupation."
7. Typical of such provisions are:
"If such injuries are sustained (1) while a passenger Is in or on a public
conveyance provided by a common carrier for passenger service (including the
platform, steps or running board of railway or street cars) . . . the company
will pay double the.amount otherwise payable." ,(Clause involved In Bew v.
Travelers Insurance Co., 95 N. J. L. 533, 112 A. 859, 14 A. L. R. 983 '(1921)
and Brown v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 8 F. (2d) 996 (C. C. A. 5th 1925)).
. . . while actually riding as a passenger or otherwise in a place regularly provided for the transportation of passengers within a surface or elevated
railroad or subway car, steamboat or other public conveyance, provided by a
common carrier for passenger service only."
(Clause Involved in the case of
Cummings V. Great American Casualty Co., 183 Minn. 112, 235 N. W. 617
(1931)).
8. The contention was argued in the case of Bew v. Travelers Ins. Co.
(ibid) though the court disposed of the case on another point and purposely
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merous determinations of commercial air lines as being of such a
status," serve to indicate conclusively the unsatisfactory use of such
terms in the absence of further contract provisions.
The procedure of requiring a warranty ° answer to direct
queries contained in the written application form, as to whether
or not the prospective insured was taking or intended to take part
in aeronautics, was, of course, available to insurers. However, the
results of a movement on foot for many years directed toward the
prevention of forfeitures for breach of immaterial warranties" that
"crouched unseen in a jungle of printed matter, ' 12 began to slowly
appear in the form of statutes greatly reducing the effectiveness of
the warranty as a matter of law, 3 and thus obviously rendering of
passed over the argument without opinion.
Planes carrying passengers for
hire were construed as not being common carriers in the cases of Brown v. Pao.
Mut. Life Ins. Co. (ibid) and North American Accident Ins. Co. v. Pitts, 213
Ala. 102, 104 So. 21. 40 A. L. R. 1171 (1921), while the opposite view was
reached In Smith v. O'Donnell. 5 P. (2d) 691 (Cal. 1932). In both the Pitts
and Brown cases the pilots owning the planes flew at such times as they desired. discriminated as to passengers, and did not pretend to keep regular
schedules. The court in the Smith decision distinguished between that case
and the former decision on the ground that in the Smith case the pilot maintained a regular -place of business for the express purpose of carrying those
who desired to fly, while such was not the case in the Brown and Pitts decisions.
See also Hutchinson. Law of Carriers (3rd Ed. 1906) Sec. 64: "It Is wholly
immaterial in what kind of vessel or vehicle or for what distance the carrying
Is done."
9. See Hotchkiss, A Treatise on Aviation Law (1928) p. 62, Sec. 52.
Curtiss-Wright Fiying Service, Inc. v. Gloss, 66 F. (2d) 710 (C. C. A. 3rd,
1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 696 (1933) : MaCusker v. Curtiss-Wright Flying
Service, Inc., 269 Il. App. 502 (1933) ; Ziser, Admnr. v. Colonial Airways, Inc.,
162 A. 266 (N. J. 1932) ; Conklin. Admnx. v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, 266
N. Y. 244, 88 S. W. (2d) 976 (1935).
10. See Vance. Handbook of the Law of Insurance (2d ed., 1930) p. 384:
"A warranty is a statement or promise set forth in the policy, or by reference
Incorporated therein, the untruth or non-fulfillment of which in any respect,
and without reference to whether the insurer was In fact prejudiced by such
untruth or non-fulfillment, renders the policy voidable by the insurer, wholly
Irrespective of the materiality of such statement or promise."
See also Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. France, 91 U. S. 510, 23 L. Ed. 401 (1875) ; Jeffries v. Life Ins.
Co., 89 U. S. 47, 22 L. Ed. 833 (1874) ; Davey v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 20 F. 482
(D. C. N. J. 1884); Kelly v. Life Ins. Clearing Co., 113 Ala. 453, 21 So. 361
(1896) : "When once it is ascertained that the statement Is a warranty, and
that it is false and the policy expressly provides for a forfeiture in that event,
the contract must be so enforced, although It concerns a matter of slight
importance and may not In any manner seriously affect the risk"; Germier v.
Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 109 La. 341, 33 So. 361 (1903) ; Cobb v.
Covenant Mut. Ben. Assn., 153 Mass. 176, 26 N. E. 230, 10 L. R. A. 666, 25 Am.
St. Rep. (1891) ; Hoose v. Prescott Ins. Co. of Boston, 84 Mich. 309, 47 N. W.
587, 11 L. R. A. 340 (1890) : Ripley v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. 136, 86
Am. Dec. 362 (1864) ;Mod. Order of Praetoriansv. Davidson, 203 S. W. 379
(Tex. Civ. APP. 1918) : Flippen v. State Life Ins. Co., 30 Tex. Civ. App. 362,
70 S. W. 787 (1902) ; Hartford Life & Annuity Co., 39 S. W. 325 (Tex. Civ. App.
1897) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Rutherford, 98 Va. 195, 35 S. E. 361 (1900) ;
floeland V. Western Union Life Ins. Co., 58 Wash. 100, 107 P. 866 (1910).
11. Vance, Insurance, op. cit. note 10, at 31.
12. See "Statutes Affecting Representations in Insurance Contracts (1932)
32 Col. Law Rev. 522 ; Vance, op. cit. note 10, at 359-406 ; Eastern Dist. Piece
Dye Works v. Travelers Ins. Co., 234 N. Y. 441, 138 N. E. 401 (1923) ; Van
Schoick v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 68 N. Y. 434, 438 (1877).
In the absence of
statute, the falsity of insured's statement, if rendered a warranty by adequate
contractual provisions, avoided the policy irrespective of its materiality.
If a
representation merely, it was generally necessary and sufficient that the false
statement influence the insurer either in accepting the risk or in fixing the
premium.
13. Ala. Code Ann. (1928) §8364; Ariz. Rev. Code (1928) §1847(3) (life);
Gen. Laws Cal. (1932) c. 145, §10113; Col. Ann. Stat. (Mills 1930) §3606j(c)
(group life only) ; Laws Del. (1921)
§606; Dist. of Col. Pub. Act 436, c. 5,
§3(3) ; Code 0a. (1933) §56911; Idaho Code Ann. (1932) §40-1303(3) ; Ind.
Ann. Stat. (Burns 1933) §39-801(5) (lifeonly) ; Code Iowa (1935) c. 399-El,
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little general importance any answers to such aeronautical inquiries
contained in policy applications.
Though statements made in answer to application queries were
still classified as representations under statutory provisions, the
practical efficacy of reliance thereon was even further removed by
judicial recognition of such representations as being without legal
effect if not material,'14 which thus of necessity cast upon the insurer
the very unsatisfactory burden of proving such representation to
have been fraudulent or material 5 in event reliance was made
thereon in subsequent litigation arising out of the death of an insured from aeronautical casualty. As recently pointed out by legal
writers, in view of the later statutes making the policy incontestable
after a certain time,'6 such a statement on the part of the prospective
insured denying any intent to engage in aviation, even if a warranty, could not be operative after the period fixed by the provisions
17
of the particular incontestability clause therein involved.
§8684-e5(2) ; Kan. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1933) §40-420(2) ; Ky. Stat. (1930) §639;
La. Gen. Stat. (Dart. 1933) §4113 ; Ann. Code Md. (1924) Art. 48a, §87 ; Ann.
Laws Mass. (1932) c. 175, §186; Mich. Comp. Laws (Cahill 1929) §12427 (life),
§12434 (group life) ; Minn. Stat. (Mason 1927) §3402(4) ; Rev. Stat. Mo. (1929)
§5732; Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929) §44-602(4) ; N. J. Comp. Stat. (1910) §286994(4) (life).Cum. Supp. (1930) §99-95a(2) (group life); N. M. Ann. Stat.
(1929) §71-161(4) ; N. Y. Ins. Laws, §58 (life),§101b(2) (group life); N. C.
Code (1935) §6466b (group life); N. D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913) §6625; Ore.
Code Ann. (1930) §§46-131, 46-506 (life) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) c. 40,
§532 (group life) ; Tenn. Ann. Stat. (Williams, 1934) §6126 (life); Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1925) Art. 4732; Utah Rev. Stat. (1933) §43-3-24(4) ;
Va. Code Ann. (1930) §4420 ; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) §7242-2.
14. See Boyer V. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 206 Cal. 273,
279, 274 P. 57, 60 (1929) ; National Life & Ace. Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 211 Ky. 12,
15, 276 S. W. 981, 982 (1925) : "If a representation is untrue and material, it
taints the contract whether fraudulent or not and if untrue and fraudulent, It
taints the contract whether material or not": of. Penn. Mutua Life Ins. Co. V.
Mechanics Savings Bank & Trust Co., 72 F. 413 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896) ; Fitzgerald
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 90 Vt. 291, 98 Ati. 498 (1916).
15. See Southern Surety Co. v. Farrell, 79 Col. 53, 55, 244 P. 475, 476
(1926) ; Security Life Ins. Co. v. Brimmer, 36 F. (2d) 176 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929) ;
Grand Lodge v. Mass. Bonding and Ins. Co., 324 Mo. 938, 949, 25 S. W. (2d)
783, 787 (1930) ; Montana Auto Finance Corp. v. Federal Security Co., 278 P.
116, 121 (Mont. 1929) ; Waynarowaki v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 3 N. 5.
Misc. 1066, 1068, 130 At. 544, 545 (1925) ; Rahov v. Bankers Life Ins. Co.,
164 App. Div. 645, 150 N. Y. Supp. 55 (3rd Dept. 1915), aff'd on opinion of
Smith, J.,176 App. Div. 918, 162 N. Y. Supp. 539 (1916), aff'd without opinion,
225 N. Y. 721, 122 N. E. 888 (1917) ; Brown V. Inter-State Business Men's
Assn., 57 N. D. 941, 948. 224 N. V. 894, 896 (1929) ; Continental Casualty Co.
V. Owen, 38 Okla. 107, 116, 131 Pac. 1084, 1088 (1913) ; Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Chandler, 120 Ore. 694, 252 P. 559 (1927) ; Kuhne et. al. v. N. Y. Life Ins.
Co., 297 Penn. 418, 423, 147 A. 76, 77 (1929) (criticized in Vance, op. cit.note
10, at 363) ; Waco Mutual Life Ins. Association v. A~ford, 289 S. W. 93, 95
(Tex. Civ. App. 1926) ; See also Vance, op. cit. note 10, at 366. Several courts
apparently have assumed that at common law a representation was ineffective
unless material and made with intent to deceive. See Security Life Ins. Co. v.
Brimmer, ibid. at 179; Enid v. National Casualty Co., 122 Ore. 547, 555, 259 P.
902, .907 (1927).
16. See note 174.
17. See Patterson, Essentials of Insurance Law (1st. Ed. 1935) p. 364:
"If the insured was asked in his application: 'Do you intend to engage in
aviation?" and answered 'No,' it seems clear that the Insurer could not avoid
liability merely by proving that after the policy was issued the insured did
engage in aviation. This conclusion follows from the language of the statutes
'and not warranties.'
Hence such a statement is only a representation of expectation or belief, which, is without legal effect if honestly made. It may be
added that, in view of the statutes making the policy incontestable after a
certain time, such a statement, even if a warranty, could not be operative
after the period fixed."
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Specific Aeronautical Exception Provisions:
Though the date of the advent of aviation into the United
States as a generally recognized mode of travel could hardly be
set as far back as 1913, it was nevertheless in that year that the
ineffectiveness of these general policy provisions to cope with such
obvious risks materialized in the adoption by insurers of specific
aviation clauses in the effort to define the exact coverage granted
in regard to aeronautic risks.
Nature and Status of Exceptions (1913-1918)--Varying only
in apparent trivial detail, these early exclusion clauses were to the
effect that participationin aviation or engaging in aviation was to
be excepted from the coverage elsewhere provided for in the particular contract. Occasionally the words aviation and aeronautics
were interchanged in expressing the activity though participating
and engaging were almost exclusively used as the expression of the
action intended to be excluded. Little, if any, effect was felt by
insurers from this new enterprise for some years, however, due to
the comparatively limited number of individuals taking part in
aviation.
Increased Importance Subsequent to 1918-From the beginning of the World War, however, the potential possibilities of aviation were evident, and spurred by wartime demands, the development
of the science of flying and construction of the planes themselves
brought aviation from its rank of experimentation to one of general public practicability. The close of the war resulting in the
sale of thousands of army planes, chiefly to discharged veteran
s
pilots, saw a phenomenal spread of aviation over the entire nation'
and its relationship with insurance became one of immediate and
practical importance. Without statistics of any kind on which to
base actuarial figures, 19 insurers obviously could not accept such
risks; while on the other hand to deny the public coverage altogether because of such activity would be self-denial of a great
business market. The business policy of the continued acceptance
of such risks under contracts containing these exclusions thereupon adopted, only serves to emphasize the importance of the construction of such clauses.

II.

ENGAGE AND PARTICIPATE EXCEPTIONS.

Airplane Passengers:
In

General-In considering these aeronautical exceptions

18. See Leonard H. Axe, Aviation Insurance (1931) P. 7.
19. See J. E. Hoskins. Aviation and Life Insurance, National Aeronautic
Magazine. April, 1936. p. 18.
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employing engage or participate as expressive of the action, used
in conjunction with various activity expressions, it is of interest to
note that with but very few exceptions, 20 decisions to date deal
exclusively with passenger death, 21 though little, if any attention
has been paid by the courts to the seemingly important items of
whether the passenger met death while flying in a private or commercial plane, or whether he was fare-paying or gratuitous. However, in cases involving clauses specifically permitting recovery in
the case of death as a fare-paying passenger such limitation on the
22
exclusion has been strictly construed.
Generally, the participating cases, until very recently, have
been construed as being inclusive of everyone in the plane during
flight,23 while the engaging clauses have been interpreted as extending only to one actively taking part in the flight of the plane,
and as not extending to a passenger.2 4 A lone decision involving
engaged in connection with aeronautic operations construed such
25
clause as not covering a casual passenger and as being ambiguous,
though with the further addition of as passenger or otherwise the
20. Irving v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 5 F. Suop. 382 (E. D. Mich.
1933) ; Taylor v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 253 N. Y. S. 55, 1931 U. S. Av.
Rep. 41 (1931); Price v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Amer., 98 Fla. 1044, 124
Charette v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 202 Wis. 470, 232
So. 817 (1929)
N. W. 848 (1930).
21. Day v. Equitable Life Assur. Co. of U. S., 83 F. (2d) 147, 235 C. C. H.
509 (C. C. A. 10th. April 7, 1936) ; Gregory v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y.,
78 F. (2d) 522 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935); cert. denied, 56 Sup. Ct. 157, 80 L. Ed.
126 (1935) ; Mayer v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 74 F. (2d) 118 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934) ;
Goldsmith V. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 69 F. (2d) 273 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934), cert.
denied, 292 U. S. 650, 54 Sup. Ct. 860, 78 L. Ed. 1500 (1934) ; First Nat. Bank
of Chattanooga v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 62 F. (2d) 681 (C. C. A. 6th,
1931) ; Head V. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 43 F. (2d) 517 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930) ; Gits
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 32 F. (2d) 7 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929) ; Pittman V. Lamar
Life Ins. Co., 17 F. (2d) 270. (C. C. A. 5th, 1927) ; Martin v. Mutual Life Ins.
Missouri State Life Ins. Co.
Co. of N. Y., 189 Ark. 291, 70 S. W. (2d) 694 (1934)
v. Martin. 188 Ark. 907, 69 S. W. (2d) 1081 (1934); Benefit Ass/n of By.
Employees v. Hayden, 175 Ark. 565, 299 S. W. 995 (1927) ; Travelers Ins. Co.
v. Peake, 82 Fla. 128. 89 So. 418 (1921) ; Tierney v. Occidental Life Ins. Co.,
89 Cal. A pp. 779, 265 P. 400 (1928) ; Murphy v. Union Indemnity Co., 172 La.
383, 134 So. 256 (1931) : Masonic Accident Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 200 Ind. 472,
164 N. E. 628 (1929) ; Flanders v. Benefit Assn. of By. Employees, 226 Mo. App.
143, 42 S. W. (2d) 973 (1931) ; Wendorff v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 318
Mo. App. 363, 1 S. W. (2d) 99 (1927) ; Meredith v. Business Men's Ace. Assoc.,
213 Mo. Apm. 688. 252 S. W. 976 (1923) ; Bew V. Travelers Ins. Co., 95 N. 5.
Law 533, 112 A. 859 (1921) ; Sneddon v. Mass. Protective Assn., Inc., 39 P. (2d)
1023 (N. M. 1935); Gibbs v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 256 N. Y. 208, 176
N. E. 144 (1931) ; Peters V. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 133 Misc. Rep. 780,
233 N. Y. S. 500 (1929) ; Provident Trust Co. of Phila. v. Equitable Life Assur.
Soo. of U. S., 316 Pa. St. Rep. 121, 172 A. 701 (1934) ; Blonski v. Bankers. Life
Ins. Co., 209 Wis. 5, 143 N. W. 410 (1932).
22. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Amos Halcomb, as Adm. of the Estate of
George R. Halcomb, deceased, 79 F. (2d) 788 (C. C. A. 9th. 1935) ; Padgett
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 206 N. C. 365, 173 S. E. 903 (1934).
23. Head v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., note 21: Travelers Ins. Co. v. Peake,
note 21; Meredith V. Business Men's Ace. Assoc., note 21; Bew v. Travelers
Ins. Co., note 21; Sneddon v. Massachusetts Protective Assn., note 21; Contra:
Gregory v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., note 21: Martin v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of
N. Y., note 21 ("We grant that our conclusion thus announced seems to be in
conflict with respectable authority on this question, but such must be the inevitable result so long as courts think and act independently of each other").
24. Benefit Assoc. of By. Employees v. Hayden, note 21; Masonic Assoc.
Ins. Co. v. Jackson, note 21; Flanders v. Benefit Ass/n of By. Employees, note
21; Peters v. PrudentialIns. Co. of Amer., note 21.
25. Gits v. New York Life Ins. Co., note 21.
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effectiveness of the clause in covering a passenger has been approved.2
Conflicting decisions have marked similar litigation involving engaging as passenger or otherwise when used in connection
with aeronautic expeditiony2 though the more recent authority
denies effectiveness to the exception in such connection. 8
Aeronautic operations when used in connection with participate
have been construed as not including a passenger,2 9 though the
contrary is true when the insured shows some degree of action in
directing the flight, even though admittedly flying in the role of a
The courts have never been faced with an exception
passenger.8
involving as passenger or otherwise used in connection with participating in aeronautical operations though general effectiveness
has been accorded such an exception in the absence of the (operaNo appreciable variations are to be found
tions) limitation.3'
between the decisions of federal and state courts.
"Participate" Exceptions-The case of Bew v. Travelers Insurance Co. 3 2 handed down by the New Jersey court in 1921 construing a participationin aeronautics exception clause as covering
a casual passenger in a plane, for many years served the dual role
of a landmark decision as to aviation exception clauses in general
and authority for consistently identical constructions of similar
clauses. However, with the launching of transcontinental airlines
in 1926, aviation definitely assumed the status of a business or
occupation, 3' and passenger litigation involving participation in
aeronautics exceptions subsequent to that date has, with but two
exceptions, 4 reversed the construction of the Bew case on the
26. Mayer v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., note 21; Goldsmith V. N. Y. Life Ins.
Co., note 21.
27. Gibbs v. Equitable Life Ass-r. Soc. of U. S., note 21; Provident Trust
Co. of Philadelphia v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., note 21; Day v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., note 21.
28. Provident Trust Co. of Phila. v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S.,
ibid., Day v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., ibid.
29. Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, note 21.
30. First Nat. Bk. of Chattanoogav. Phoenix Mutual-Life Ins. Co., note 21.
31. Head v. New York Life Ins. Co., note 21
32. 95 N. J. L. 533, 112 Atl. 859, 14 A. L. R. 983, 1928 U. S. Av. Rep. 151;
Comment (1929) 1 Air Law Rev. 152 (Bew was killed in the crash of a sightseeing plane in which he was flying as a passenger at Atlantic City, N. J. His
insurance policy written in the sum of $3000 contained a condition that It did
not cover injuries fatal or non-fatal sustained while participating or in consequence of having participated in aeronautics. Hold: that Bew met death
while participating in aeronautics and that the exception in the policy barred
recovery).
33. Illustrative of this transition is the case of Mason4c Assoc. Ins. Co. v.
Jackson, note 21, where the Indiana Appellate. Court in 1925 held a non-farepaying passenger to be "engaging in aviation" because of the non-occupationa?
status of aviation, and the Indiana Supreme Court reversed this opinion in 1929
because of the occupational status of aviation.
N. M ... , 39 P. (2d) 1023
,
34. Sneddon v. Mass. Protective Assn., Inc.
(1935) ; Note (1935) 6 Air Law Rev. 193 (Sneddon was killed in the crash of
a plane in which he was riding with a friend as a casual Invitee. The crash
occurred Nov. 27, 1932 In Gallup, N. M. The policy on which the suit Is here
based contained a clause excepting from coverage death sustained as the result
of participation in aviation, aeronautics or subacquatics. Held: Flying in an
airplane is participationin aviation or aeronautics and complaint is dismissed).
Head et al v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co.; Head v. Hartford Ace. d Indemnity Co.,
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basis of the changed meaning of aeronautics since the advent of
the occupational era.3 5 Particularly important in this respect is the
recent highly publicized 1935 Gregory v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of
N. Y. decision. "
It is interesting to note the marked similarity in the reasoning
of the courts in the Bew and Gregory decisions even though obviously directly contra results were reached. Unequivocally rejecting a prior judicial construction of participatein connection with
an alleged violation of a banking statute as requiring active conduct
or an affirmative knowledge of the fraud committed 3 7 the New
Jersey court in the early Bew case turned to dictionary definitions
of participate as meaning "to receive or have a part of; to partake
of; experience in common with others; partake, as to partake in a
discussion,"38 and of aeronautics as meaning "the art or practice
The latter was distinof sailing or floating through the air."3
guished from aviation which was described as being limited to
"problems dealing with artificial flight by means of flying ihachines
heavier than air."40
In combining these definitions of participate and aeronautics,
the conclusion was reached that "partaking of the art or practice
of sailing or floating through the air" was the proper construction
of the clause and therefore a passenger was included within such
43 F. (2d) 517 (C. C. A. 10th 1930), 1930 U. S. Av. Rep. 235; Note (1930) 1
Air Law Rev. 488 (Head was an insurance salesman, and took a flight in a
plane In 1929 for the purpose of inspecting the plane before writing a policy
on it. The plane crashed, killing Head. He was insured by the N. Y. Life Ins.
Co. under a policy containing a participation as a passenger or otherwise in
aviation or aeronautics exception in the double indemnity provision, and by the
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. under a policy containing a while participating or
in consequence of participating in aeronautics exception. Held: There is no
substantial difference in the two exceptions and both cover the death of the
insured. Judgment for defendants.)
35. Martin v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. y., 189 Ark. 291, 71 S. W. (2d)
694 (1934) ; Note (1934) 5 JOURNAL OF Am LAW 661; Note (1934) 6 Air Law
Rev. 193 (Martin was killed In the crash of a plane in which he was riding as
the guest of friends on a flight from Augusta, Ark. to St. Louis, Mo. This suit
is based upon an exception In the Double Indemnity provision of a life policy
excluding liability where death resulted from participationin aeronautics Held:
Participate connotes to have an active share in the management, and therefore
insured did not come within the ambit of this exception. Court stated "We
grant, that our conclusion thus announced seems to be in conflict with respectable
authority on this question, but such must be the inevitable result so long as
courts think and act independently of each other." Judgment for plaintiff).
Gregory et at v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N Y 78 F. (2d) 522 (C. C. A. 8th
1935) Cert. denied 56 Sup. Ct. 157, 80 L. Ed. 126 ; Note (1935) 6 JOURNAL OF AIR
LAW 626 ; Note (1936) 30 111. L. Rev. 672 (Gregory was killed in the same crash
as Martin in the case of Martin v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. (ibid). He was
the father of the pilot of the plane and had purchased the plane. The policies
here involved contained provisions that the insurance company should not be
liable for double indemnity for death resulting from participationin aeronautics.
Heed: The terms must be considered in the light of known revolutionary changes
and development In the art of aviation and a passenger on a transport plane
Is not participatingin aeronautics. The exception Is ambiguous. Judgment for
plaintiff.)
36. Ibid.
37. Mason v. Moore et al, 73 Ohio St. 275, 76 N. E. 932, 4 L. R. A. (N. s.)
597, 4 Ann. Cas. 240 (1906).
38. Standard Dictionary (1920).
39. Ibid.
40. Bew v. Travelers Ins. Co., note 32, 95 N. J. L. at 534, 112 Atl. at 860
(1921).
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categorical definition. However, obiter on the part of the court to
the effect that "aeronautics does not describe a business or occupation like engineering or railroading, but an art which may be practiced for pleasure or profit, and is indulged in by all who ride
whether as pilots or passengers"' 1 left open a wide loophole for a
directly contra conclusion subsequent to the advent of aviation into
the occupational field. Seizing the implications of this statement,
the Gregory case reached the contrary conclusion in combining the
Bew construction of participate as meaning "to take part in," and
the occupational connotation of aeronautics as of the time of interpretation in 1935, to mean "taking part in actual flying" 42 and as
therefore not covering a casual passenger. Such conclusion in
favor of the insured was, however, as has likewise been true in
every decision adopting such viewpoint, further substantiated by
declaring the exception ambiguous and as therefore invoking the
well known legal truism that any ambiguity in an insurance con43
tract is to be construed against the insurer.
Of assistance only in clearing doubts as to any alleged variance
between aviation and aeronautics,which alleged variation it termed
as "hairsplitting distinctions," was the early case of Meredith v.
Business Men's Accident Association,4 4 while other cases involving
41. Ibid.
42. Gregory v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., note 35, 87 F. (2d) at 524
(1935).
43. Aschenbrenner v. U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 292 U. S. 80, 54 Sup. Ct. 861,
78 L. Ed. 1474 (1933) ; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hurni Packing Co., 263 U. S. 167,
44 Sup. Ct. 90, 68 L. Ed. 235, 31 A. L. R. 102 (1923) ; MacMaster v. N. Y. Life
Ins. Co., 183 U. S. 25, 22 Sup. Ct. 10, 46 L. Ed. 64 (1901) ; Thompson v. Phoenix
Ins. Co., 136 U. S. 287, 10 Sup. Ct. 1023, 34 L. Ed. 413 (1890); Northwestern
Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Banning, 63 F. (2d) 736 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933) ; Gorman
V. Fid. & Casualty Co., 55 F. (2d) 4 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932) ; Wharton v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 48 F. (2d) 37 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931); Chase v. Business Men's
Assur. Co. of Amer., 51 F. (2d) 34 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931) ; East & West Ins. Co.
v. Fidel, 49 F. (2d) 35 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931)
Graham v. Bus. Men's Ass'n of
Amer., 43 F. (2d) 673 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930)
Schambs v. Fidelity & Casualty
Co. of N. Y., 259 F. 55 (C. C. A. 6th, 1919); Philadelphia Casualty Co. v.
Fecheimer, 220 F. 401, Ann. Cas. 1917D64 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915); O'Brien v.
North River Insurance Co., 212 F. 102, L. R. A. 1917C 727 (C. C. A. 4th, 1914) ;
Illinois Automobile Ins. Exchango v. Southern Motor Sales Co., 207 Ala. 265,
92 So. 429, 24 A. L. R. 734 (1922) ; Kelly v. Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen,
308 Il. 508, 140 N. E. 5, 29 A. L. R. 243 (1923) ; Hesaler V. Federal Casualty
Co. of Detroit, Mich., 190 Ind. 68, 129 N. E. 325, 14 A. L. R. 1329 (1921);
American Surety Co. V. Pangburn, 182 Ind. 116, 105 N. E. 769, Ann. Cas. 1916E
1126 (1914) ; Maddox et al. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y.. 193 Ky. 38, 234
S. W. 949, 22 A. L. R. 1276 (1921) ; General Ace. Fire ,& Life Assur. Corp. V.
Louisville Home Telephone Co., 175 Ky. 96, 193 S. W. 1031, L. R. A. 1917D
952 (1917); Williams v. Southern Surety Co., 211 Mich. 444, 179 N. W. 272,
15 A. L. R. 1234 (1920) ; MacDonald v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 304 Pa. 213,
155 Atil. 491. 77 A. L. R. 353 (1931)
Bank of Commerce and Trust Co. v.
Northwestern National Life Ins. Co., Tenn. -,
26 S. W. (2d) 135, 68 A. L.
R. 1380 (1930); Volunteer State Life Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 146 Tenn. 589,
244 S. W. 44, 26 A. L. R. 1270 (1922)
Newsome v. Commercial Casualty Co.,
147 Va. 471. 137 S. E. 456, 52 A. L. R. 363 (1927) ; Bell v. American Ins. Co.,
173 Wis. 533, 181 N. W. 733, 14 A. L. R. 179 (1921); Graham v. London
Guarantee Co., 56 Ont. L. Rep. 494, 2 Dom. L. Rep. 1037, 15 Brit. Rul. Cas. 397
(1925).
For numerous further citations adopting and affirming this rule see
14 R. C. L. 926, Sec. 103, n. 9; R. C. L. Perm. Suop. p. 3708, Sec. 103, n. 9;
R. C. L. 1935 Pcket. Supp., p. 1106, see. 103, n. 9.
44. 213 Mo. App. 688, 252 S. W. 976, 1928 1. S. Av. Rep. 159 (1923)
(Meredith was killed in the crash of a plane in which he was riding as a
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the point have either been identical with the Bew or Gregory
45
decisions.
Though the construction of an aeronautical exception clause
has never as yet been directly passed upon by the United States
Supreme Court,"" the 1934 decision of this court in the case of
4 7
involving
Travelers Protective Association cf America v. Prinson
the construction of a "participating in the moving or transportation
of explosive substance or substances" proviso tends to support the
reasoning employed by the Bew case in reaching the conclusion
that a casual airplane passenger came within the bounds of a
participation in aeronautics exception. Speaking through Justice
Cardozo, 4 8 the court in the Primson case recognized the conflict
between various state and federal courts as to whether or not there
is the necessity of any causal nexus between the injury or death
and the forbidden forms of conduct in a participate exception, 9
and in concluding against such necessity, sustained the exception
there involved as embracing the death of an insured due to the
explosion of dynamite caps being carried in a truck on which he
was riding as a business invitee.
passenger for hire at Breckenridge, Mo. Policy held by Meredith excluded
death while participating in aeronauticsr from coverage, but contained another
provision granting coverage to insured while doing any act pertaining to a
hazardous occupation while insured is engaged in games or sports for recreation. Held: The risk exception provision governs, and as Meredith was participating in aeronautics at the time of his death, judgment rendered for insurer).
45. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Peake, 82 Fla. 128. 89 So. 418, 1928 IT. S. Av.
Rep. 156 (1921); note (1921) 31 Yale L. J. 217 (Peake was seriously injured
in the crash of a plane at the Alabama State Fair in which he was riding
as a passenger for hire.- This suit is brought on an accident policy excepting
from coverage injuries fatal or nonfatal sustained by the insured while participating or in consequence of having participated in aeronautics. Held: "A
passenger in an airplane flying in the air, whether he takes part In the operation
of the airplane or not is participating in aeronautics within the intent and
meaning of the provision specifically excepting such a risk from the Indemnity
Head
(Italics are the authors.)
contract contained in the policy herein").
et al. v. New York Life Ins. Co.; Head v. Hartford Ace. & Indemnity Co., note
34; Sneddon v. Massachusetts Protective Assn., Inc., note 34; Martin v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., note 35.
46. Cert. denied, Goldsmith v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., note 21; Cert. Denied,
Gregory v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., note 35.
47. 291 U. S. 576. 54 Sup. Ct. 502, 78 L. Ed. 999 (1933).
48. Mr. Justice Stone wrotea dissenting opinion.
49. Courts construing that there must have been an aggravation of the
hazard to which death or Injury was owing: Matthes v. Imperial Ace. Assn.,
110 Iowa 223, 81 N. W. 484 (1900) ; Bradley v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co.,
45 N. Y. 422 (1871) ; cf. Jones v. United States Mutual Ace. Assn. of City of
N. Y., 92 Iowa 652, 61 N. W. 485 (1194) ; Accident Ins. Go. v. Bennett, 90
Tenn. 258, 16 S. W. 723 (1891) : Murray v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 96 N. Y. 614
(1884)
Benham v. American Central Life Ins. Co., 140 Ark. 612, 217 S. W. 462
(1919)
Kelly v. Fid. Mut. Life Ins. Co.. 169 Wis. 274, 276, 172 N. W. 152
Bloom V. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 97 Ind. 478 (1884).
(1919)
Courts holding that in policies so phrased there Is no need of any causal
nexus between the injury or death and the forbidden forms of conduct: Order
of United States Conmercial Travelers v. Greer, 43 F. (2d) 499 (C. C. A.
1930) : Flannagan v. Provident Life & Ace. Ins. Co., 22 '. (2d) 136 (C. C. A.
4th, 1927) ; Murdie v. Md. Casualty Co., 52 F. (2d) 888 (Dist. Ct. Nev. 1931) ;
Shader v. Railway Passenger Assur. Co.. 66 N. Y. 441 (1876) ; Conner v. Union
Automobile Ins. Co., 122 Cal. App. 105, 9 P. (2d) 868 (1932) ; Bradshaw v.
Farmers A Bankers Life Ins. Co., 107 Kan. 681, 193 P. 332 (1920) ; Order of
United Commercial Travelers v. Tripp, 63 F. (2d) 37 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933);
cf. United States Fidelity A Guaranty CO. v. Guenther, 281 IT. S. 34, 50 Sup.
Ct. 165. 74 L. Ed. 683 (1929) ; Met. Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 252 N. Y. 449, 169
N. E. 642 (19,30).
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"Engage" Exceptions-Dictum in the early Bew decision to
the effect that "if it had been intended to confine the application
of this provision to those who pilot and manage the physical operations of such vessels, it probably would have been expressed by
using some language as engaging . . ." 0 sufficed to indicate, even
before the first decision involving an engaging in aeronautics clause
was handed down, 'the strong possibility of such exception being
judicially construed as not covering a casual passenger. And indeed, though bitterly condemned by insurance counsel as a "distinction in form which did not exist in substance," 51 litigated decisions
have consistently rejected such passenger coverage under an engaged
exception.52
Unlike the courts in participation decisions, no strictly etymological analysis of the word engage has been employed by courts
in construing such clauses, but rather a tendency has been demonstrated of looking to prior litigated decisions involving analagous
situations for authority.
Illustrative of this tendency-was the initial case involving an
engaged aeronautical exception clause, Benefit Association of Railway Employees v. Hayden,13 where entire reliance was placed upon
an insurance case interpreting an engaged in military or naval
service in time of war exception clause as not covering death from
influenza while in the wartime military service, because "in order
to exempt the company from liability the death must have been
shown to have been caused while the insured was doing something
connected with the military service, in contra-distinction to death
while in the service due to causes entirely or wholly unconnected
with such service."
The necessity of taking affirmative action
before the connotation of engaged was met is obvious.
50. Bew V. Travelers Ins. Co., note 32 at 534, 112 AtI. at 860.
51. Vaughn Miller, "Validity and Construction of Aeronautic Clauses In
Policies of Life Insurance." Address delivered before the Association of Life
Insurance Counsel, May, 25, 1931, at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia.
Mr. Miller is General Counsel of the Volunteer Life Ins. Co., Chattanooga,
Tenn. Sec. L.I.C. Vol. 5, p. 74.
52. Benefit Assn. of By. Employees v. Hayden, note 21: Masonic Assn.
Ins. Go. v. Jackson, note 21; Peters v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., note 21;
Flanders v. Benefit Assn. of By. Employees, note 21; Gits v. N. Y. Life Ins.
Co., note 21.
53. 175 Ark. 565. 299 S. W. 995, 57 A. L. R. 622, 1929 U. S. Av. Rep. 79
.(1927) (Insured killed in the crash of a plane in which he was taking a short
pleasure trip at the Stuttgart, Ark., Rice Carnival. Insured's policy contained
the following proviso: 'This policy does not cover disability or fatal Injury
received by the insured . . . (3) while engaged in aeronautics or underwater
navigation.' Held: The exception here merely was an inhibition against insured engaging In the business and did not apply to a single flight. Judgment
for plaintiff).
(Italics are the authors.)
54. Benham V. Amer. Cent. Life Ins. Co., 140 Ark. 612, 217 S. W. 462
(1919).
This case has been approved and followed in the following decisions:
Nutt v. Security Life Ins. Co., 142 Ark. 29, 218 S. W. 675 (1920) ; Barnett v.
Merchants Life Ins. Co., 87 Okla. 42, 208 Pac. 271 (1922) ; Boatwright V. Amer.
Life Ins. Co., 191 Iowa 253, 180 N. W. 321, 11 A. L. R. 1085 (1920) ; Long v.
St. Joseph Life Ins. Co., 225 S. W. 106, affirmed, 248 S. W. 923 (1923).
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Immediately subsequent litigation of passenger claims under
such exception,56 however, placed a still further necessity of continuity of action before the categorical requisites of engaged when
used in connection with aviation were met. Prior judicial interpretations of the expression in connection with other activity,
formed the authority for the construction in the cases of Peters v.
Prudential Life Ins. Co. 6 and Masonic Accident Ins. Co. v. Jackson"7 to the effect that the expression gave the connotation of
"participation as an occupation, with the impression being the same
when engaged was used in connection with aeronautics as if it had
been used in connection with engineering or any other occupation
or profession." 58
It is interesting to note that in these citations of prior authority
only one insurance decision, other than the military case 59 cited in
the Hayden decision, is to be found; that being a Vermont decision
holding insured not to have been engaged in the sale of intoxicating
liquor even though the evidence showed that he had made occasional
sales while working at a hotel bar. 60 Great reliance was placed on
two criminal cases, one a North Carolina decision holding the defendant not guilty of "engaging 'in the business of procuring laborers for work outside the state" because of the necessity of proving the doing of more than one act in the line of such occupation
before the requirements of the word engaged were met,61 and the
other a New York decision construing an engaging in gambling
statute as requiring more than occasional participation and as con62
noting some continuity or practice.
Though consistently argued by respondent beneficiaries in every
case, the New York Court in Peters v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
55. Masonic Ac. Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 200 Ind. 472, 164 N. E. 628, 61 A.
L. R. 840, 1929 U. S. Av. Rep. 84 (1929); Note (1929) 4 Ind. L. Jour. 416;
Note (1929) 2 So. Cal. L. Rev. 498: Peters v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer.,
233 N. Y. S. 500, 133 Misc. Rep. 780, 1929 U. S. Av. Rep. 67 (1929).
56. Ibid. (Plaintiff's husband was killed in the crash of a plane in which
His life was insured by a policy issuedi by
he was riding as a passenger.
defendant insurer containing a clause excepting from coverage death resulting
from having been engaged in aviation or submarine operations or military or
naval service in time of war. Held: The clause does not include death resulting to a passenger in an airplane in time of peace. The clause was further
found to be ambiguous).
57. Note 55 (Joseph L. Jackson was killed April 29, 1923, in the crash
His accident insurance
of a plane in which he was flying as a passenger.
policy issued by the insurer defendant contained a provision excepting the
engaging in aviation
while
company from liability if death or disability resulted
or ballooning. Held: Aviation means the art of flying, especially the management of aeroplanes, and engaged means to carry on, conduct, or employ oneself, and not relating to single acts. Therefore, insured was not engaged in
aviation at the time of his death. Judgment for plaintiff).
58. Peters v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., notes 55 and 56, 233 N. Y. S.
at 502, 133 Misc. Rep. 782. (Italics are the authors.)
59. Benham v. Amer. Cent. Life Ins. Co., note 54.
60. Gutltman v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 69 Vt. 469, 38 A. 315 (1897).
61. State v. Roberson, 136 N C. 587, 48 S. E. 595 (1904).
62. People v. Bright. 203 N. Y. 78, 96 N. E. 362, Ann. Cas. 1913A. 771
(1911).
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Amer.6 3 has been the only judiciary to declare an engaged in aviation exception, when construed in relation to a casual passenger as
being ambiguous and therefore to be construed against the insurer."' The clauses were consistently, however, construed in the
light of the connotations of the expressions as of the time of such
construction rather than of the time the contract was written. 5
Effect of "Activity" Expression Used-A strict construction
of the word operations as tending to indicate a continuous and
occupational relation when used in conjunction with aeronautics
in both participating and engaging exceptions has apparently definitely established the ineffectiveness of such clauses in covering
death of an insured while flying either as fare-paying or gratuitous
passenger,"" though evidence of action on the part of a passenger
of even less degree than actual handling of the mechanism of flight
will suffice to constitute an exception to this general rule.17 Effectively demonstrating this latter tendency is the Federal case of
First National Bank of Chattanooga v. Phoenix Insurance Company68 involving the death of a passenger in the crash of his private
plane while insured under a~policy containing an aeronautic opera63. Notes 55 and 56.
64. An "engaged in aeronautic operations" exception was declared ambiguous when construed in relation to the death of a casual passenger in the
case of Gits v. New York Life Ins. Co., note 21, while an "engaging in aviation
or submarine operations or in military or naval service in time of war" exception was similarly construed In the case of Charette v. Prudential Ins. Co.
of Amer., note 20, involving the death of an insured while piloting a plane.
65. See infra pages 330-332.
66. Gits v. New York Life Ins. Co., 32 F. (2d) 7 (C. C. A. 7th 1929),
1929 U. S. Av. Rep. 70, cert. denied, 280 U. S. 564, 50 Sup. Ct. 35, 74 L.
Ed. 633 (1929) ; Note (1929)
1 Air Law Rev. 151 (A. M. Gitts, wealthy
Oak Park, Ill., manufacturer was killed in the crash of a plane in which le
was taking a short pleasure flight at Estes Park, Col. The Double Indemnity
Benefit Provision of a $10,000 policy issued on his life by defendant contained
an engaging in submarine or aeronautic operations liability exception.
Held:
The word operations tends to indicate an intended continuous and occupational
relation, and the exception does not include the death of Gits. Further the
exception is ambiguous. Judgment for plaintiff).
Missouri State Ins. Co. v. Martin, 188 Ark. 907, 69 S. W. (2d) 1081 (1934)
Note (1934) 5 'Air Law Rev. 661: Note (1934) 5 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 504
(George W. Martin was killed April 18, 1933, in the crash of a private plane
in which he was riding as a gratuitous passenger. His life was insured by a
$1,000 policy issued by defendant which contained a Double Indemnity provision for accidental death. Among the exceptions listed In this provision was
death resulting from participating In aviation or submarine operations. Held:
Though the word participate standing alone might denote activities not included
in the narrow compass of engaged in when the effect of operations is considered
(which can only mean the management and control of the airplane) it becomes
more apparent that participation is to be considered in its active sense and
viewed as the equivalent of engaged in.
Judgment for plaintiff).
67. First Nat. Bank of Chat. v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 62 F. (2d) 681
(C. C. A. 6th. 1933) (Suit brought to recover on Double Indemnity benefit provisions of policies issued on the life of one Patten Each of these provisions contained "directly or indirectly, wholly or partly from participation in aeronautic
operations" liability exceptions. Patten was killed in the crash of a plane belonging to his company, though piloted by a licensed pilot. The evidence showed
that he was flying to Florida to see his wife who was ill and ordered the pilot
to take off, though the latter objected because of inclement weather. Held:
The facts disclosed that though insured was not personally piloting the plane,
the venture was his initiative and undertaking, and was solely for his purposes.
Under such circumstances he was participating in aeronautic operations. Judgment for defendant).
68. Ibid.
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tion exception used in connection with participation. Evidence to
the effect that the insured ordered the pilot to begin the flight in
spite of the latter's objection because of poor visibility, led the court
to conclude, on the basis of a construction of the contract as of the
time of issuance, that one who imposes and enforces his-judgment
in the venture is effectively participating in the operation of the
plane and included within the ambit of such exception.
The application of such clauses to passenger death has led in
every case involving the question, with the exception of the First
Nat. Bk. of Chattanooga v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. decision, " °
to the declaration of such exclusions as being ambiguous. 70 However, the Federal decision, Gits v. New York Life Ins. Co.,71 laid
a precedent for important subsequent litigation in declaring the ambiguity of such exception as being emphasized by the "facility with
which the insurer could have included passengers within the exception were it so intended."
"As Passenger or Otherwise"-As was indicated in the implication of the dictum in the Gits decision, the addition of the
phrase as passenger or otherwise has been generally recognized as
making any exception clause in which it is used all-inclusive of
every person riding in the plane, regardless of whether the insured at the time of the fatal crash was a farepaying 72 or non-fare69. Note 67.
70. Gits v. New York Life Ins. Co., note 66: Missouri State Ins. Co. v.
Martin, note 66.
71. Note 66.
72. Gibbs v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of U. S., 256 N. Y. 208, 176
N. E. 144 (1931) ; Note (1932) 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 135 (Harold Gibbs was
killed in the crash of a passenger plane operated by the Coastal Airways, Inc.,
between Albany and New York, while riding as a fare-paying passenger: He
was insured by a policy issued by the defendant, which contained a double indemnity provision issued to cover accidental death. Among the exclusions from
such coverage was death resulting directly or indirectly from engaging as a
passenger or otherwise in submarine or aeronautic expeditions. Held: The intent of the parties to the insurance contract (written in 1924) grew out of and
reflected the general belief that presence on a trip or journey in a vessel or
machine of this type In regular transit constituted such a momentous adventure
and was accompanied by such unusual danger and extraordinary hazard that
neither party expected the policy to cover the risk of casualty. Judgment for
defendant).
Mayer v. New York Life Ins. Co.. 74 F. (2d)
118 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934)
Note (1935) 6 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 278 (Insured met death in the crash of a
plane while flying as a fare-paying passenger on a regular air line. The policy
issued on his life by insurer defendant excepted from the Double Indemnity
Benefit death resulting from engaging as a passenger or otherwise in submarineor
aeronautic operations. Held: The words as a passenger or otherwise define and
modify the words engaging in aeronautic operations and are unlimited in scope.
The death of the insured is covered by the exception. Judgment for defendant).
Goldsmith v. New York Life Ins. Co., 69 F. (2d) 273 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934) ;
Note (1934) 5 Air Law Rev. 213; Digest (1934) 5 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 504
(Bernie M. Goldsmith was killed March 19, 1932, in the crash of a plane on
which he was riding as a casual fare-paying passenger. He was insured by the
defendant insurer for $30,000 in two policies, both of whi ch contained double
indemnity for accidental death provisions with death from engaging as a passenger or otherwise in submarine or aeronautic operations being excepted therefrom. Held: While without the words as passenger or otherwise there would be
room for doubt as to the meaning and scope of the expression engaging in aeronautic operations, the addition of those words does away with any ambiguity
and shows that the phrase engaging as a passenger or otherwise in aeronautic
operations is intended to cover one who is temporarily occupied in being a
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paying passenger75 or whether he was riding in a private plane7
or on an established air line. 75 Peculiarly enough this all-inclusive
construction has even been unanimously adopted in cases involving
an engaged in aeronautic operations exception clause in connection
with death of an insured while a casual passenger, 6 in spite of
consistent decisions that such an exception, without the as passenger or otherwise addition, can refer only to those actively operating the machine, 77 and that ambiguity is always present when the
78
application of such exception to passenger death is attempted.
Two recent opinions interpreting the phrase as not covering a
casual passenger when used in connection with engaged in aero-

nautic expeditions79 constitute the exceptions to the above general
rule, though in placing a different construction on the intent of
the parties in the use of the word expeditions a result entirely
consistent with the majority ruling has been reached in a New York
decision involving identical facts.80 It must be pointed out,
passenger In a plane as well as one who takes an active part In the operation
and makes aeronautics his business. Judgment for defendant).
73. Head v. New York Life Ins. Co., note 34.
74. Head V. Now York Life Ins. Co., ibid.
75. Gibbs v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of U. S., note 72: Mayer v.
N. Y. Life Ins. Co., note 72; Goldsmith v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., note 72.
76. Goldsmith v. New York Life Ins. Co., ibid.
77. Irwin v. Prudential Ins. Go. of America, note 20; G8ts v. New York
Life Ins. Co., note 66; Taylor v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, note 20; Price
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 98 Fla. 1044, 124 So. 817, 1930 U. S. Av. Rep.
118 (1930) ; Note (1929) 1 Air Law Rev. 277 (1930), 16 Va. L. Rev. 505 (John
W. Price was killed Jan. 2. 1927, In Duval County. Fla., when a plane which he
was piloting crashed to the ground.
He was Insured for $50,000, with the
policy containing a Double Indemnity for Accidental Death provision which,
among other things, excepted engaging in aviation or submarine operations or
in military or naval service in time of war from coverage. Held: The in time
of war phrase refers only to the next preceding phrase military or naval service,
and not also to the more remote phrase aviation or submarine operations. The
13rovision engaged in aviation operations means that the death of the insured
must have resulted from having taken part in aviation operations other than by
merely being in an airplane when it fell to the ground and caught fire, thereby
fatally injuring the Insured. The declaration filed in the suit failed to allege
that deceased insured was piloting the plane at the time of the crash and the
court considered the case on the pleadings.)
78. Gits v. New York Life Ins. Co., note 66.
79. Provident Trust Company of Philadelphia v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc. of U. S.,316 Pa. St. Rep. 121, 172 At]. 701 (1934)- (The Insured, Francis R.
Ehle, was killed Nov.5, 1931, while riding as a fare-paying passenger on a plane
operated by the Ludington Line which crashed between Newark and Camden,
N. J. Ehle was insured by the defendant insurer by policies containing double
indemnity provisions for accidental death, which excepted, among other things,
engaging as a passenger or otherwise in submarine or aeronautic expeditions.
Held: A passenger in an aeroplane expedition would seem to be one having some
part in the conduct and operation of the expedition. So far as it appears the
parties used the words in their commonly understood sense and so intended them
to measure their obligation. Judgment for plaintiff).
Day v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of the U. S., 83 F. (2d) 147, 235 C.
C. H. 509 (C. C. A. 10th, Apr. 7, 1936) ; Digest (1936) 7 JOURNAL Or AIR
LAW 420 (Day was flying as a gratuitous Invitee In the plane owned and
piloted by one Reed, a friend, who had fifty hours of flying to his credit
at the time of the fatal flight.
The plane crashed on the outskirts of Denver,
Colo., killing Day.
He was insured by the defendant insurer with a $5,000
olicy which contained a double indemnity provision for accidental death.
xcepted from the coverage of this provision was death caused indirectly or
directly by engaging as a passenger or otherwise in submarine or aeronautic
expeditions. Held: Contract words will be given the meaning that common
speech imports, and as it is not believed that anyone, in common speech, would
ever refer to an ordinary short trip in a plane as an expedition, the flight in
which the insured was killed is not covered by the exclusion. Judgment for
defendant reversed).
80. Gibbs v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of U. S., note 72.
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however, that the more recent status of the Day and Provident
Trust Co. opinions," and the use of authority appearing subsequent
to the New York case as substantiating this contra conclusion
seems to indicate an 'extreme likelihood that such exceptions will be
held equally ineffective in future litigation if used in connection
with expedition.
It is interesting to note at this point the "boomerang" effect
of the as passenger or otherwise dictum in the Gits case.13 Listed
in this 1929 decision as clearly removing ambiguity from all exception clauses, it was subsequently unanimously approved as having
that effect.84 However, in 1935, the court in the Gregory v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co. decision interpreted this practice of adding as passenger or otherwise to ordinary expedition clauses subsequent to
the Gits case, as an admission on the part of insurers of the ambiguity of such exceptions in the absence of the addition.6 The
irony of such construction is emphasized when the fact is taken
into consideration that the policy involved in the Gregory case,
which did not contain the as passenger or otherwise addition to the
aeronautical exception clause, was issued in 1925, four years prior
to the time when the effect of such addition was even first suggested.
"Except as a Fare-Paying Passenger"--Though, as has
been previously pointed out, the payment or non-payment of fare
by an insured riding in a plane is recognized as being of no consequence whatsoever in the determination of the applicability or nonapplicability of liability exception clauses as to death resulting from
such flight,'s the courts have, nevertheless, in cases involving an
except as a fare-paying passenger limitation to the exception clause,
given full recognition to such phrase.87 A Federal decision in 1935
81.
of U.

Provident Trust Co. of Philade.phia v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc.

S., note 79; Day v.

Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of U. S., note 79.

82. Restatement of the Law of Contracts (American Law Institute, 1932).
Sec. 235 (a) : "The ordinary meaning of language throughout the country is
given to words unless circumstances show that a different meaning Is applicable."
Aschenbrenner v.

83.

United States and Guaranty Co., note 43.

Gits v. New York Life Ins. Co., note 66.

84.

Head v. New York Life Ins. Co., note 34; Gibbs v. Equitable Life As-

87.

Padgett v.

surance Soo. of U. S., note 72: Goldsmith v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., note 72; Mayer
v. New York Lifo Ins. Co., note 72.
85. Gregory v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., note 35 at 524.
86. See supra p. 309ff.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 206

N.

C. 365,

173 S.

E.

903

(1934) (Walton E. Padgett was killed in the crash of a plane in which he was
flying from Lincolnton, N. C., to Charlotte, N. C., with a friend who was piloting the plane. There was no evidence whatsoever tending to show that Padgett
paid or contemplated paying any fare for the trip. The Double Indemnity for
Accidental Death clause of the insured deceased's policy contained the followIng exception: while participating in aviation or aeronautics except as a farepaying passenger. Held: All the evidence showed that the Insured was riding
,with his employer, upon the latter's invitation, and that no fare was paid or
contemplated by either. Hence recovery is barred under the terms of the exception. Judgment for defendant).
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Amos Halcomb, as Adm. of the Estate of
George R. Halcomb, deceased, 79 F. (2d) 788 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935) ; Note (1936)
7 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 143 (Insured killed in the crash of a private plane
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involving an accident policy granting aeronautical coverage to insured while flying as a fare paying passenger,88 even went so far as
to construe an agreement on the part of the insured to pay fare
as a contract malum prohibitum and as therefore not permitting the
classification of the insured within the bounds of the "fare-paying
passenger" proviso, where the pilot's license did not permit of carrying passengers for hire,89 and a statute of the particular state made
it a misdemeanor for a pilot to operate a plane in any manner
except that for which he had been licensed by the government. 0
Airplane Pilots:
On only two occasions have the courts been faced with the death
of an insured under a policy containing an aeronautical exception
clause while actively piloting a plane,9 1 and though identical exception clauses and substantially identical facts were involved in
both cases, directly contra and irreconcilable decisions mark the result of the litigation. Tersely rejecting any ambiguity contention
and citing only the Price case 2 as authority for the rule that "being
engaged in aviation operations means taking part in the operations
owned and flown by the holder of a federal private pilot's license, which permitted the licensee to pilot a' plane in private flight but specifically prohibited
the flying of aircraft for hire. A California (over which state flight was made)
statute made it a misdemeanor for a pilot to operate a plane in any manner
except that for which he had been licensed by the government. Insured paid
no fare before the flight, but respondent argued on trial of the case that there
was an implied contract between the insured and pilot for payment of such fare
and that this implication constituted insured a fare-paying passenger, thus
bringing his death within the coverage of a policy issued on his life by defendant insurer which contained the following exception: death shall not have
resulted from bodily injuries sustained while participating in aviation or aeronautics except as a fare-paying passenger. Held: No contract can be created
by an attempted agreement for the services of a person required to be licensed
under California Law for the protection of the person to be served, nor implied from a iequest for an acceptance of such unlicensed services. Therefore
as insured was not a fare-paying passenger he cannot recover under the policy.
Judgment for defendant).
88. Met. Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Halcomb, ibid.
89. The pilot of the plane held the following Federal license: "This certifies that the pilot whose photograph and signature appear hereon is a private
pilot of aircraft of the United States. The holder may pilot all types of licensed
aircraft, but may not for hire transport persons or property nor give piloting
instruction to students."
90. California Civil Statutes (1929) p. 1875, Sec. 5: "It shall be lawful for
any person to operate or participate in the operation of any aircraft within the
State of California or to act as an airman In connection therewith if such
person is licensed and registered under the laws of the United States or any
regulation made pursuant thereto, but it shall be unlawful for any person to
act as an airman In any capacity except that for which he Is licensed under the
laws of the United States or any regulation adopted pursuant thereto."
Sec. 8: "Any person, firm, association or corporation violating any of the
provisions of this act, which violation is not herein declared to be a felony, shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more
than one thousand dollars, or imprisoned for not more than six months, or be
subject to both such fine and imprisonment."
91. Taylor v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 142 Misc. Rep. 94, 253 N. Y. S.
55. 1931 U. S. Av. Rep. 41 (1931) ; Charette v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,
202 Wis. 470, 232 N. W. 848, 1931 U. S. Av. Rep. 48 (1931).
The insured in
the case of Price v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., note 77, was also piloting the
plane at the time of his death, but faulty pleading failed to bring this fact
before the court and the case was considered as though insured was a casual
passenger.
02. Price v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., note 77.
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of an airplane in some direct way," a New York court concluded
in the case of Taylor v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America9 3 that recovery was precluded by an aviation or aeronautic operations exception clause where insured met death while actively piloting a
plane.
, The Wisconsin court, however,' in the Charette v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of America 94 case involving a similar situation refused to
accept the clear implication of consistent aeronautical exception
clause litigation to the effect that one actively piloting a plane was
engaging in aeronautic operations, but instead placed great emphasis on the inconsistencies of cases interpreting the word engaged
and on this basis concluded the clause to be ambiguous. Even viewing as evidentiary of this ambiguity the fact that the judges of the
Wisconsin bench could not agree on the exact meaning of the exception, the court goes far afield of litigated insurance cases to
further sustain its opinion. Typical of the decisions cited in the
substantiation of this ambiguity conclusion was an Alabama case to
the effect that engaged in implies occupation or continuous activity
distinguished from a single act,9 5 and another decision interpreting
the same phrase when used in connection with an ordinance imposing a penalty against a person who is engaged in shooting as
applying to a single act.9
Members of Airplane Crew-Other Than Pilot:
In General-Since the advent of aviation into the business
field in the form of commercial airlines, the query as to whether
or not an ordinary aeronautical exception clause would cover the
death of an insured whose employment calls for constant flying
under the same hazards as the pilot himself, but who neither takes
part in the actual operation of the plane nor rides in the passive
93. Taylor v. Prudentian
lns. Co. of Ame'r. note 91 (Gordon A. Taylor was
killed in the crash of a small two-seated monoplane which he was piloting. The
evidence showed Taylor to be a member of the 'Taylor Brothers Aircraft Corp.'
and that the plane in which he was killed was one of the products of this corporation. and known as the 'Taylor Chummy.'
Taylor was insured under a
policy containing an aviation or submarine operations or military or naval service in time of war exception clause. Held: The in time o war phrase refers
only to the last antecedent, and as insured was piloting the plane, he was engaging in aviation operations and insurer Is not liable. Judgment for defendant).
94. Charette v, Prud. Ins. Co. of Amer., note 91 (Charette witnessed a solo
landing of one Rollins, and after criticizing same, offered to show him how to
Improve It. Taking over the controls, Charette took off and a few minutes later
the plane went Into a tailspin, and crashed into Milwaukee Bay drowning
Charette. Deceased was Insured by defendant insurer by a $2,000 policy which
contained a Double Indemnity for Accidental Death provision excluding from
coverage death resulting from having been. engaged in aviation or submarine
operations or in military or naval service in time of war. Held: The clause is
ambiguous when applied to the death of a casual passenger and therefore is
to be interpreted most favorably to the insured. Judgment for plaintiff).
95. Nashville, C. & St. L. RB. v. City of Attalla, 118 Ala. 362, 24 So. 450
(1898).
96. Smith v. State of Ala., 50 Ala. 159 (1873).
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manner of a casual passenger, has been of ever-increasing importance. Mechanics, radio experts, stewardesses, etc., have become
indispensable to the commercial feasibility of successful aeronautical operations, yet such employees cannot be said to follow aviation as an occupation even though they find their employment in
flying.
Dicta of Decisions Interpreting Other Aeronautical RisksComplete lack of litigation on the point makes any conclusions as
obviously nothing more than speculation, though dicta and implications involving other aeronautical risks suffice to indicate what in
all likelihood will be the judicial attitude if and when the question
is litigated.
Prior to the recent Gregory decision 97 there apparently would
be little doubt as to the efficacy of a participation in aeronautics
exception clause as extending to and covering members of the
crew, and though force and effect of this exception as applying to
a casual passenger was denied in this decision, dictum is to be found
in the reasoning of the court indicating that such construction would
not be followed in the case of a crew member. Evidence of this
possibility is to be observed in the court's statement to the effect
that "those who ride in the plane for some purpose connected with
may well be indulging in some branch of activits operation . .
ity connected with aeronautics; but one who rides the plane for the
sole purpose of going some place .. .is not .. .participating in
aeronautics. He does not belong to the same craft or class as those
skilled artisans who participate in the construction, management, or
operation of the plane."98 More direct implication could hardly be
desired.
A more recent interpretation of participate as having the same
connotation as engage99 suffices to indicate that the above construcwould also likely be adopted in a situation involving an engaging in
aeronautics exception, though the continued strict construction of
clauses involving aeronautical operations as referring only to one
actively piloting a plane 00 rather suggests the ineffectiveness of a
clause involving such operations in covering a member of the crew.
However, as was demonstrated in the First MVat. Bk. of Chattanooga
v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. case, 01 if it can be shown that the
97.
98.
99.

Gregory v. Mutua Life Ins. Co., note 35.
Note 35, 78 F. (2d) at 523.
Martin v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., note 35.

100. Irwin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., note 20; Gits v. N. Y. Life Ins.
Co., note 66 ; Missouri State Ins. Co. v. Martin, note 66 ; Price v. Prudential Ins.
Co. of Amer., note 77; Taylor v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Amer., notes 91
and 93.
101. First National Bk. of Chattanooga V. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co..
note 67.

'
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plane is being operated according to the command or directions of
one flying therein other than in the capacity of a pilot, such party
in command is considered as taking part in the operations and
covered by the exception.
Since the 1934 Mayer v. New York Life Ins. Co. federal decision interpreted an engaged in aviation operations as a passenger
or otherwise exception as being so general as to include everyone
in a plane "whether an airplane employee, pilot, mechanic or executive, whether a fare-paying passenger or one traveling on a pass
or under a license whose death results from his presence on a plane
at the time of the accident,' '10 2 little doubt has been felt as to the
all-inclusive effectiveness of every exclusion containing an as passenger or otherwise addition. That clauses involving aeronautic
expedition constitute an important exception to this general statement, however, was clearly pointed out in the Day v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc. of U. S. decision' 0 3 handed down in April, 1936,
by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The precise problem, however, is one for the future, and will
have to remain open until such day as progress and human catastrophe bring it into the courts.
The Insured While Not Actually in Flight:
In General-The inherent dangers connected with airplanes
before takeoffs, after landings, and during forced landings have
naturally served to raise the important inquiry as to whether or
not death resulting from injury sustained under any of these circumstances would be included in the exception clauges generally
considered as referring only to accidents arising while the plane is
in actual flight. Five decisions104 involving generally this point
have sufficed to lay down the general rule that the aeronautic activity of one who takes an airplane trip includes not only the flight
itself but the approach to and departure from the plane, as well as
activities incident to landings necessitated by emergencies arising
before completion of a contemplated flight.
Before and After Flight-Illustrative of this generally ac102. Note 72.
103. Note 79.
104. Pittman v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 17 F. (2d) 370 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927).
1928 U. S. Av. Rep 188; Cert. denied, 274 U. S. 750, 47 Sup. Ct. 764, 71 L. Ed.
1331 (1927) ; Tierney v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. App. 779, 265 P. 400,
1928 U. S. Av. Rep. 191 (1928): Note (1932) 3 JOURNAL o AIR LAW 321 ;
Murphy v. Union Indemnity Co., 172 La. 383, 134 So. 256, 1931 U. S Av. Rep. 35
(1931) ; Note (1931) 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 321; Wendorf v. Missouri State
Life Ins. Co., 318 Mo. App. 363, 1 S. W. (2d) 99, 57 A. L. R. 615, 1928 U. S. Av.

Rep. 168 (1927) ; Note (1928) 16 Georgetown L. Rev. 496 ; Blonski v. Bankers
Life Ins. Co., 209 Wis. 5, 243 N. W. 410, 1932 U. S. Av. Rep. 57 (1932) ; Note
(1932) 17 Minn. L. Rev. 334; Note (1932) 3 JOURNAL OF A R LAW 661 (193g).
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10 5
cepted rule is the Federal case of Pittman v. Lamar Life Ins. Co.

where participatingin aeronauticactivity was construed as covering

the death of insured resulting from being struck, while walking
away, by the propeller of a plane in which he had just made a
flight. A marked tendency toward strict construction of such exception clauses has been demonstrated by the courts, however,
with a striking illustration of such tendency being afforded in a
recent California case 106 permitting recovery, under a statement of
facts identical with the Pittman case cited above, because of the
use of the phrase in consequence of in connection with the usual
Construing such
participating in aeronautics exception clause.
phrase as necessitating conclusive proof that the flight was the

proximate cause of death before the applicability of the exception
clause could be permitted, the court placed great emphasis on evidence to the effect that the insured talked to friends for several
moments before walking into the path of the propeller and on this
evidence concluded that death was not in direct consequence of the
flight and therefore not within the bounds of the aeronautical
exception.
Actual intention of the parties has proved to be an element
of primary importance where construction involved death prior to
actual takeoff. Illustrative of the importance of this intent is a
recent Wisconsin decision'0 7 holding an engaged in aeronautics
105. Ibid. (Pittman owned a plane in partnership with one Bally. After
the two had made a flight one day they landed at Love Field near Dallas, Tex.
Baily got out to get a dolly to put under the ship, and while he was gone
insured got out of the plane and was walking toward his car In front of the
plane when he was struck by the turning propeller and killed. His policy,
Issued by defendant, contained a participation in any submarine or aeronautic
Held:
expedition or activity, either as a passenger or otherwise exception.
The term aeronautic activity is broad enough to cover what is ordinarily incident to an airplane .trip. The aeronautic activities of one who takes such a
trip do not begin or end with the actual flight, but include his presence or movements in or near to the machine incidental to beginning or concluding the trip.
Judgment for defendant).
106. Tierney v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of-Cal., note 103 (Tierney flew as
a passenger In a plane near Venice, Cal. On landing at the destination, insured
answered questions put to him In an ordinary tone of voice, acknowledged introductions to two officers, stepped from the cockpit onto the left wing of the
He bent over to avoid a drift wire and as he
plane, then to the ground.
straightened up was struck and killed by the turning propeller. His accident
policy contained the following exception clause: This policy does not cover any
injury, fatal or nonfatal, sustained by the insureA while participatingor in consequence of having participatedin aeronautics. Herd: When the machine clears
the earth and returns successfully to the earth and is resting securely upon the
Therefore insured was not
ground the 'aeronautics'-the flight-Is completed.
participating in aeronautics at the time of his death. As the facts further show
that the pilot was not the proximate cause of insured's death but there was
the intervening act of deceased in poor judgment In so conducting himself after
climbing out of the machine as to be struck by the propeller. Therefore his
death was not in consequence of having participated in aeronautics. Judgment
for plaintiff).
107. Blonski v. Bankers Life Ins. Co., note 104 (Plaintiff was Injured when
struck by the propeller of an airplane which he was spinning to start the motor.
The evidence showed that he was preparing to taxi the plane across the field,
take on gas, and then take off on a flight. Insured was a licensed pilot. His
insurance policy issued by the defendant contained the following proviso: 'The
disability benefits herein provided shall not be granted If the disability shall
result from engaging or participating as a passenger or otherwise in aviation or
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exception to cover the death of insured while spinning the propeller
of a plane preparatory to taking off, because it was shown that
insured intended to actively pilot same after he had started the
motor; and a Louisiana decision' 08 construing a while in or on a
device for mechanical navigation exception clause' 01 as covering
death of a passenger killed while boarding a plane, on the basis
of evidence showing insured was boarding with the intent of flying

in such plane. As to whether or not the exception clause in the
Wisconsin case'10 would have been given effect had the evidence
shown insured intended merely to fly as a passenger in the plane,
is, of course, conjectural, though the innuendo of the opinion negatives any such likelihood.
During Forced Landings-The broadest scope yet to be accorded the general theory that aeronautic activities of one who takes
a plane trip do not begin or end with the actual flight but include
also movements or presence in or near the machine incidental, to
the beginning or conclusion'of the trip, was the result of a Missouri
decision' construing a while in or on any mechanical device for
aerial navigation exception clause 12 as covering death of insured
as the result of drowning when thrown from a seaplane by the
aeronautics. Held: Plaintiff, in starting the motor incidental to beginning a
trip, was engaging in performing an act which was so immediately connected
with and incidental to the triD on which he was about to embark, that he was
then engaging in aviation or aeronautics within the meaning and intention of
the exemption provision of the policy. Judgment for defendant).
(The deceased insured,
108. Murphy v. Union Indemnity Co., note 104.
with some friends, chartered a seaplane for a trip across Lake Pontchartrain.
After flying across the lake they alighted in the Tchefuncta river alongside the
shore. Insured landed, and after conversing with friends, returned to the plane,
which was stillalongside the shore, and stepped on the wing thereof to get
aboard. 'While in the wing he stepped within the path of the moving propeller
and was fatally injured. His accident insurance issued by defendant, contained
the following provision: This insurance does not cover . . . injuries, fatal or
otherwise, sustained by the Insured while in or on any vehicle or mechanical
device for aerial navigation, or in falang therefrom or therewith, or while operating or handling any such vehicle or device. Held: It is clear that the clause
meant very distinctly that the defendant would assume no risk connected with
aerial navigation. In this case the insured was in the very act of embarking
on an aerial trip, and was injured and killed as a direct result of his said effort
to embark thereon. Judgment for Defendant.)
109. See entire aeronautical exclusion clause italicized in above note (ibid.).
110. B~onski v. Bankers Life Ins. Co., note 104.
111. Wendorff v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., note 104. (The insured met his
death while a passenger en route from Miami, Fla., to Biami in the Bahama
Islands on an aircraft of a type called a seaplane. Because of engine trouble
the plane was forced to alight at sea, and shortly thereafter was capsized by the
waves. A few minutes later the lifeless body of the insured was seen floating
in the water close by. At the time of his death, insured held a policy Issued by
defendant, which contained as an exception to a $10,000 coverage provision for
accidental death the following clauses:
'The -insurance hereunder shall not
cover injuries fatal or nonfatal . . . sustained by the insured . . . while in or
on any vehicle or mechanical device for aerial navigation, or in falling therefrom or therewith, or while operating or handling any such vehicle or device.'
Held: If a flight is interrupted by mechanical trouble necessitating an involuntary or forced landing, tfhe Interval during which the craft is supported by the
watery element instead of the air is as much a part of the flying trip as the
other. We are clearly of the opinion that the clause in controversy applies to
aircraft In the situation shown to have existed in this case."
Judgment for
defendant.)
112. See entire aeronautical clause italicized In above note (ibid.).

AERONAUTIC RISK EXCLUSION

impact of high waves while the machine was resting on the water
during a forced landing.
While Flying in a Glider or Motorless Craft-Nor is it
necessary for an insured to be flying in a plane in order to come
within the scope of aeronautical exception clauses. This conclusion
3
was reached in one of the most novel cases yet to arise," wherein
was involved the death of a physical director as the result of the
crash of a glider in which he was riding as the sole occupant purely
for recreation and pleasure. In construing these facts in relation to
an engaged in aviation operations -exception clause, a Michigan
Federal District Court ruled that such clause was not to be construed as referring only to aviation operations as an occupation or
for profit but to aerial flight of any character whatsoever, and concluded on the adopted rule of strict construction of operations exceptions, that beneficiary could not recover in the instant case."'
Judicial Construction of Aeronautical Exceptions:
"In Time of War" Clause Limitation-Though insurers obviously incurred no small amount of liability by the choice of engage
as expressive of the action intended to be excepted under an avia5
tion exclusion clause, their position has been on four occasions"
placed in double jeopardy by not only using engage but in adding
or in military or naval service in time of war to the aviation exception, without punctuation of any kind. Twice this situation has
occurred in litigation involving passenger death 1' 6 and twice involv7
ing death of a pilot." *
Seizing the opportunity of greatly limiting the aviation exception or in the alternative having the clause declared ambiguous and
thus to be construed against the insurer, beneficiaries have con113. Irwin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 5 Fed. Supp. 382 (E. D. Mich.
1933) ; Note (1933) 5 Air Law Rev. 382 (Suit to recover under a policy issued
on the life of one Harold C. Young. Evidence showed that Young, who was a
Y. M. C. A. Physical Director, had been interested for some time in the flying
of gliders, had organized glider clubs, and given instructions in the operation of
the crafts. On Oct. 23. 1931, while flying alone at Bay City, Mich., the glider
crashed to the ground killing him. At the time of his death, he was insured by
defendant insurer under a policy which contained the following exception to the
Double, Indemnity provision for accidental death: 'No accidental death benefit
shall be payable If the death of insured resulted from suiciOe, whether sane or
insane; from having been engaged in military or naval service or in aviation or
submarine operations' (italics are the author's). Held: Giving to the words of
the exception clause, their plain, popular, ordinary meaning, it seems quite clear
that the act of operating aircraft through the air is an aviation operation and
that the person who Is so operating such aircraft is engaged in an aviation
operation. Judgment for defendant.
114. Id. at 384.
115. Price v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer.,-note 77; Peters v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of Amer., notes 55 and 56; Charette v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer.,
notes 91 and 94; Taylor v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., notes 91 and 93.
116. Price v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., note 77 (see also note 91)
Peters v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer.) notes 55 and 56.
117. Charette v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., notes 91 and 94; Taylor v.
Prud. Ins. Co. of Amer., notes 91 and 93.
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sistently contended that the omission of punctuation causes the
exception to have effect only in time of war insofar as aviation or
submarine operations and military or naval service are concerned.
This argument, however, has been adopted on only one occasion, 18s
with the remaining decisions taking the directly contra view." 9
The most frequently cited authority for this latter construction is
the familiar rule to the effect that qualifying words, phrases and
clauses are to be applied to the words or phrase immediately preceding, and are not to be construed as extending to or including
others more remote, unless such extension is clearly required by a
consideration of the entire text. 120 Such an extension was, of
course, unnecessary on the interpretation of the policy text as having the connotation of excluding extremely hazardous risks, and in
the classification of aviation and submarine operations as being risks
of such nature at all times, as distinguished from military and
naval service which were to be classified in the hazardous category
only in time of war.
Ambiguity-Widespread recognition of the legal platitude
that where insurance contracts are so drawn as to be ambiguous
or require interpretation or are fairly susceptible of two different
constructions so that reasonable intelligent men on reading them
would honestly differ as to their meaning, the courts will adopt
that construction most favorable to the insured, 1 ' has led to varied
and irreconcilable viewpoints on the part of both state and federal
courts in aeronautical exception clause litigation. 122 The explana118. Peters V. Prudential Ins. Co..of Amer., notes 55 and 56. The court
said in part, "It is inconsistent to say that the author of the provision had in
mind the risk from aviation and submarine operations in time of peace, as well
as in time of war, and the risk from military and naval service, which involves
aviation and submarine operations, only in time of war. If he limited the risk
from military and naval service, which includes aviation and submarine operations, to time of war, he must have had the same limitations in mind when he
used the terms aviation and submarine operations, particularly since these
terms are not set off by commas."
119. Note 115.
120. 2 Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction (2nd ed. 1904)
§§420 and 421; Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of the
Law (2nd ed. 1911), c. 5, §73; 36 Cyc. 1123. Cf. Holmes v. Phenix Ins. Co. of
Brooklyn, 98 F. 240 (C. C. A. 8th. 1899) ; Pudget Sound Electric Railway et at.
v. Benson, 253 F. 710 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918) ; Cushing et al. v. Worrick, 9 Gray
(75 Mass.) 382 (1857) ; Traverse City v. Blair Tp., 190 Mich. 313, 157 N. W.
81. Ann. Cas. 1918E. 81 (1916) ; State v. Scaffer, 95 Minn. 311, 104 N. W. 139
(1905) ; Yebraska State Railway Commission v. Alfalfa Butter Co. et. at., 104
Neb. 797, 178 N. W. 766 (1920) ; Summornan v. Knowles, 33 N. J. Law 202
(1868) ; Wood v. Baldwin, 56 Hun. 647, 10 N. Y. S. 195 (1890) ; People v. Salter,
191 App. Div. 723, 182 N. Y. S. 252 (1920) ; Chestnut Hill &iSpring House Turnpike Road Co. v. Montgomery County, 228 Pa. 1, 76 A. 726 (1910) ; Jorgensen
et al. v. City of Superior, 111 Wis. 561, 87 N. W. 565 (1901) ; Zwietuschy et al.
v. Village of East Milwaukee, 161 WVis. 519, 154 N. W. 981 (1915) ; Dagan v.
State of Wiscolstn, 162 ""'is. 353, 156 N. W. 153 (1916).
121. See citation of numerous authorities as to this rule; note 43.
122. Peters v. Prud. Ins. Co. of Amer., notes 55 and 56 (engaged in aviation operations construed as ambiguous as relating to death of casual passenger) ;
G s v. N. Y. Life Ils. Co.. note 66 (engaged in aeronautic operations construed
as ambiguous as relating to death of casual passenger) ; Charette v. Prud. Ins.
Co. of Amer., notes 91 and 94 (engaged in aviation operations construed as
ambiguous as relating to death of casual passenger) ; Missouri State Ins. Co. V.
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tion for the marked frequency with which courts treat the question
in such cases is apparent when consideration is given to the fact
that the plaintiff beneficiaries had everything to gain and nothing
to lose in the consideration of such contention by the judiciary,
and therefore have argued the point in practically every case yet to
arise.
Only on one occasion since the transition of aviation into the
occupational category,1 2 3 has participating in aeronautics exception
clauses been considered as unambiguous, 2 4 though, with unanimity,
cases arising before such occupational era adopted the contra
view.125 Failure of insurers to add as passenger or otherwise to
the exception has been construed in more recent decisions as em126
phasizing ambiguity.
Grounds for adoption of ambiguity in the various decisions
vary from a simple statement to the effect that "the language is
inept"'127 to lengthy citation and detailed explanation of authorities
construing in various ways expressions used in the particular exception clause.' 2 Failure of the judges of the appellate court
rendering the decision to agree as to the exact meaning of the
illustrative of ambiguity
exception has even been cited in one case as
29
in the particular clause therein involved.
Though, as has been stated on one occasion, "the court will not
do any fine or precise balancing of reasons or splitting of hairs to
uphold its contention,"'" 30 the court can yet resort to the construction
of ambiguity only when, after using such helps as are proper to
arrive at the intent of the parties, some of the language used or
Martin, note 66 (participating in aviation operations construed as ambiguous as
relating to death of casual passenger) ; Martin v. Mutual Life'Ins. Co., note 35
(participating in aeronautics construed as ambiguous relating to death of casual
passenger); Gregory v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., note 35 (participation in aeronautics construed as ambiguous as relating to death of casual passenger);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Peake, note 45 (participating in aeronautics construed as
not ambiguous as relating to death of casual passenger) ; Masonic Ace. Ins. Co.
v. Jackson, notes 55 and 57 (engaged in aviation construed as not ambiguous
as relating to death of casual passenger) ; Goldsmith v. New York Life Ins. Go.,
note 72 (engaging as passenger or otherwise in aeronautic operations construed
as not ambiguous in relating to death of a casual passenger) ; Taylor v. Prudential Ins. Co., notes 91 and 93 (aviation or submarine operations construed as
not ambiguous as relating to death of pilot) ; Irwin v. Prud. Ins. Co. of Amer.,
note 113 (engaged in aviation operations construed as not ambiguous as relatIng to pilot of glider) ; Sneddon V. Mass. Protective Ass'n., note 34 (participation in aeronautics construed as not ambiguous as relating to death of casual
passenger) ; Day v. Eq. Soc. of U. S., note 79 (engaging as a passenger or otherwise in aeronautic expedition construed as not ambiguous as relating to death
of casual passenger).
123. See infra page 331.
124. Sneddon v. Mass. Protective Assn., Inc., note 34.
125. Bew v. Travelers Ins. Co., note 32; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Peake, note
45; Meredith v. Business Men's Ace. Ass'n., note 44.
126. Gits V. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., note 66; Mo. State Life Ins. Co. v. Martin,
note 66; Gregory v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., note 35.
127. Peters v. Prud. Ins. Co., notes 55 and 56.
128. Gits v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., note 66; Charette v. Prud. Ins. Co. of
Amer., notes 91 and 94.
129. Charette v. Prud. Ins. Co. of Amer., note 91.
130. Id., 232 N. W. at 850.
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phrases inserted in the'policy are still of doubtful import. 131. The
ambiguity construction cannot apply where the language is unequivocal and unambiguous and sufficiently plain and clear as to
express the intent of the parties. 13 2 Nothing can be read into a
policy which is not there by action of such contracting parties. 133
Nor is the fact that the intent might have been better expressed
of any serious import, as it is ambiguity and not awkwardness of
language which opens the door for such construction in favor of
the insured.134 As to the formulation of any sort of definite criterion as to the ambiguity or non-ambiguity of any particular exception clause, only a study of the bases used and attitudes expressed by the courts in the various decisions involving such contentions, is needed to conclusively show the impossibility of any
such achievement. 3 5 Connotations of words and groups of words
vary according to the opinions and reactions of the particular
individual, and this element of human discretion is, of course, beyond the realm of categorical fixation.
Time-One of the most noticeable tendencies on the part of
courts construing the various aeronautical exception clauses is the
utter disregard, in the majority of cases, of the time when the
contract was formulated between the parties and of the meaning
of the particular terms used in expressing the exception at such
time.
Particularly illustrative of this arbitrary tendency as meaning
the difference between recovery and non-recovery under a policy
containing an aeronautical exception clause, is the case of Masonic
Accident Ins. Co. v. Jackson."' Faced with a statement of facts
showing insured to have been killed in 1923 while flying in a plane
as a non-fare-paying passenger, and while insured under a policy
containing a clause to the effect that death or disability of the insured while engaged in aviation was not covered by such policy, the
Appellate Court of Indiana, deciding the case in 1925,'18 held:
"Suppose the policy had provided it should not apply to anyone 'engag131. See Foot v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 61 N. Y. 571, 585
(1875).
132. 82 C. J. 1158, Sec. 265 (c).
183. Irwin v. Prud. Ins. Co. of Amer., note 113.
134. Goldsmith v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., note 72.
135. Illustrative of two diametrically opposed views as to ambiguity interpretations in cases involving identical facts and aviation exceptions, is the
following statement in the recent Day v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S.. note
79, case referring to Gibbs v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., note 72 (both
cases involving engaging as passenger or otherwise in aeronautic expeditions
construed in relation to death of an insured while flying as a casual passenger).
"Although entertaining the highest respect for the Court of Appeals of N. Y.,
we do not agree that there is a necessary ambiguity or conflict in a clause embracing passengers on expeditions .
136. Notes 55 and 57.
137. 147 N. E. 156.
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ing in tobagganing,' could it be asserted with
one riding on the sled, but who had no part
of the sled, was not engaged in tobagganing?
row-boat to take us for a pleasure ride on a
he engaging in boating."

any degree of plausibility that
in the management or steering
If we engaged the owner of a
river, we most certainly would

However, on appeal to the Supreme Court of Indiana, the
decision handed down in 1929," s subsequent to the definite establishment of aeronautics as an occupation, rejected this mere action
criterion of engaged as related to a non-occupational activity, and
adopted that of continuity of action, basing its conclusions on the
following premise:
"To say that one is 'engaged' in an occupation signifies much more than

the doing of one act in the line of such occupation."189

Other cases adopting substantially the same mode of interpretation as the above case are: Benefit Association of Railway
Employees v. Hayden (decided 1927; date of policy not shown;
insured killed in 1926) ;140 Price v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer.
(decided 1929; policy issued in 1925; insured killed in 1927) ;141
Gits v. New York Life Ins. Co. (decided 1929; policy issued in
1920; insured killed in 1923) ;142 Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v.
Martin (decided 1934; policy issued in 1921; insured killed in
1933) ;1'4

Goldsmith v. New York Life Ins. Co. (decided 1934;

policy issued in 1925; insured killed in 1932) ;144 Mayer v. New
York Life Ins. Co. (decided 1934; policy issued in 1921; insured
killed in 1931) ;145 Gregory v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (decided 1935;
policy issued in 1925; insured killed in 1933.)14G
As late as 1935, in the argument on the Gregory case,' 14 7 in-

surers have unsuccessfully contended that neither lapse of time nor
extrinsic nor intrinsic changes in science, art, or mechanical development can possibly change the meaning that must be judicially
given to contractual language, which at the time of its adoption by
the parties excluded a certain risk, so as to make that very language mean such a different thing as to include in 1933 the very
risk, which in 1925 the parties agreed by such language should be
excluded.
And in the rejection of such contention, the not unimportant
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Notes
Note
Note
Note
Note
Ibid.
Note
Ibid.
Note
Ibid.

55 And 57.
55. 164 N. E. at 631 (italics In text are the author's).
53.
77.
66.

72.
35.
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query is raised as to whether the courts are following the familiar
rule that "contracts must be construed with reference to the intention of the parties at the time of entering into the contract"'' 48 and
are not in obvious effect violating the principle laid down by the
United States Supreme Court in the case of Commonwealth of
Virginia v. West Virginia41 that "the contract is still to be interpreted according to its true intent, though altered conditions may
have varied the form of fulfillment." Truly suggestive is such
language of another interesting inquiry as to just what is the true
intent of a contract of life insurance with respect to risks that in
their nature are likely to change during the expected life of the
policyholders.
Intent-Illustrative of the conflicting views of courts as to
this intent are the decisions involving expeditions as expressive of
the activity to be excepted from coverage. 1 9 One construes the
use of such word in the contract made prior to the occupational era
of aviation as expressive of the intent to exclude every flight made
by insured in a plane ;151 while another interprets the use of the word
in a policy also issued during the preoccupational era of aviation,
as being indicative of intent to exclude a certain extraordinary hazard which at that time made flight in a plane an expedition, and
that if conditions change and travel by airplane is no longer subject
to such hazards, the exception was not intended to apply. 152 In still
another and more recent expedition decision, the court further confuses the situation in presenting the reasoning that "if it were
intended when the policy was drafted and offered for sale to exclude
from coverage every loss resulting from an airplane trip or flight,
it is believed that counsel drafting the clause could have found
148. See 13 C. J. 523, §482. Commonwealth of Virginia v. West Virginia,
238 U. S. 202, 236; 35 S. Ct. 795, 809; 59 L. Ed. 1272, 1288 (1915) ; McNaughton
V. Stephens, 8 Ga. App. 545, 70 S, E. 61 (1911) ; Batchelder v. Batchelder, 220
Mass. 42, 107 N. E. 455 (1914).
149. Ibid.
150. Gibbs v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of U. S., note 72; Provident
Trust Co. of Philadelphia v. Equitable Life Assurance Soo. of U. S., note 79;
Day v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of U. S., note 79.
151. Gibbs V. Equitabie Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., ibid.: "We conclude,
therefore, that. in excluding from the benefit of a double indemnity death resulting to a passenger in a submarine or aeronautic expedition, the intent of
the parties to the insurance contract grew out of and reflected the general
belief that presence on a trip or journey in a vessel or machine of this type in
regular transit constituted such a momentous adventure and was accompanied
by such unusual danger and extraordinary hazard that neither party expected
the policy to cover the risk of casualty."
152. Prov. Trust Co. of Philadelphia v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of
U. S., note 79: "Appellant notes that, in 1926, aviation was extremely hazardous
and not generally recognized as a method of transporting passengers, and suggests that the parties for that reason intended to include in the words aeronautical expeditions all flights by airplane; that is, that all travel by airplane
in the conditions then existing would be excepted, because any flight might
perhaps be considered an expedition. In spite of that arbitrary understanding,
if conditions change and travel by airplane is no longer subject to the extraordinary hazard which once made flight an expedition, the exception cannot be
held to hayve been intended to apply."
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language less apt to mislead the buying public than such a redoubt53
able phrase as this."
Life insurance contracts, unlike most contracts which contemplate performance at a reasonably definite time or times, usually so
near in the future that language will have the same meaning when
the time for performance arrives that it has when the contract is
executed, always involve the possibility that performance may extend over a long period of years-long enough for changing conditions to change the meaning of words. And, as observed by Mr.
Justice Holmes while on the bench of the United States Supreme
Court "a word is not a crystal, transparent, and unchanged; it is
the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the -circumstances and the time in which it is
used."1

54

If this seemingly adopted view of construing aeronautical exceptions as of the time of interpretation without regard to the time
of the issuance of such policy seems to warp the recognized theories
of contracts, it must be remembered that insurance is gradually
evolving away from the law of contracts. Typical of the recognition
of such fact is the statement of Dean Pound of the Harvard School
of Law in his Lecture on Judicial Empiricism, 55 to the effect that
"our courts have taken the law of insurance practically out of the category of
contract, have taken the law of surety companies practically out of the law
of suretyship and have established that the duties of public service companies
156
are not contractual.'

Present Status of Policies Relying on "Engage" and "Participate"
Aviation Risk Exclusions:
Obvious lack of any appreciable degree of consistency in the
numerous interpretations and constructions of the varied aeronautical exception clauses gives rise to the query as to whether there is
really any distinction between engage and participate or have the
courts created, as was suggested recently in an address before the
Association of Life Insurance Counsel,' 57 a "distinction in form
that does not exist in substance?" Certainly lengthy and detailed
decisions drawing narrow lines of distinction between the two
153. Day v. Equitable Life Assurance Sao. of U. S., note 79.
154. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418, 425; 38 Sup. Ct. 158, 159; 62 L. Ed.
372, 376 (1917).
155. Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law (1921) p. 186.
156. See also Patterson, Essentials of Insurance Law (1st Ed. 1935) p. 44:
"The general law of contracts has been warped almost beyond recognition In
applying it to insurance controversies."
157. Vaughn Miller, General Counsel, Volunteer Life Ins. Co., Chattanooga,
Tenn.. speaking before Association of Life Ins. Counsel, May 25, 1931. Address
reprinted in L. I. C., v. 5, p. 74.
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action expressions, 5" bear evidence of opinion, at least on behalf
of some federal and state courts, that variation does in reality exist
in substance, though such decisions themselves contain.evidence of
the interchange of the words as conveying a similar idea when the
courts abandon the role of precisionist and discuss the issues
involved.
Among the more definite classifications of the words as being
expressive of the degree of activity excepted from the coverage
of the policy were judicial interpretations to the effect that "engage
means that one must take part in the operations of the plane in some
way other than participating in flying,"15 and "participate denotes
activity not included in the narrower compass of the word engage."' 0 Other decisions, however, have added the necessity of
continuity of action to the above,' 6 ' arriving at the conclusion that
"the word engage gives the impression of meaning something more
1 2
than occasional participation,"'
while the real meaning of engage
has been suggested, in another jurisdiction, to be entirely dependent
on the particular activity with which it is used, varying from the
meaning of simple singular action in the case of non-occupational
activity to that of continuity of action-of such a degree as to ap63
proach a vocation in the case of an activity of occupational status.
Such distinctions, however, have been flayed in more recent
cases as being "hairsplitting and subtle" and as being based on
meanings understood by scholars and not as used in the ordinary
speech of the people.6 4

-

Such denunciations have ultimately re-

sulted in the conclusion that "participatehas the meaning and effect
65
of engaging in and other words of similar import and meaning,''
though it is to be particularly noted that in this abolition of distinction between the two expressions, both have been thrown, when
used in connection with aviation, into the continuity of action category, long recognized as demanded by the occupational status of
such activity. 6
Though admittedly well founded in authority and reason when
construed in such manner where the particular policy involved was
issued subsequent to the recognized advent of aviation into the
158. First Nat. Bk. of Chattanooga v. Phoenix Mit. Life Ins. Co., note 67 ;
Flanders v. Benefit Ass'n. of Ry. Employees, note 21; Goldsmith v. N. Y. Life
Ins. Co., note 72; Git v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., note 66; Price v. Prudential Ins.
Co. of Amer., note 77 ; Peters v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., notes 56 and 55.
159. Flanders v. Ben. Ass'n. ly. Emp., note 21.
160. First Nat. Bk. of Chattanooga v. Phoenix Mnt. Life Ins. Co., note 67.
161.

Ibid., Peters v. Prud. Ins. Co. of Amer., notes 55 and 56; Gits v. N.

Y. Life Ins. Co., note 66.
162.

Peters v. Prud. Ins. Co. of Amer., ibid.

163. Goldsmith v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., note 72.
164. Mo. State Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, note 66. 69 S. W. (2d)
165. Ibid..; Gregory v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., note 35.
166. Supra pp. 312-313.

at 1084.
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occupational field, such a construction of participate and engage
obviously tends to work an unreasonable hardship on the insurer
when litigation involves a contract entered into at a time when
aviation was recognized as only an art or sport a67 and as not requiring more than mere presence in the instrumentality to classify
one as being both participatingand engaging. Numerous opinions,
however, promulgated by highly respectable courts, are to be found
adopting such mode of construction. 168
It is submitted, in the light of these authorities, that insurance
companies will in all likelihood be held liable in cases involving
any of the millions of insured persons holding policies containing
these engaging and participatingexception clauses where death results
from riding as a casual passenger in either a private or transport
plane. 69 Pilots and members of the crew, however, will be included
within the exclusion,'170 while, with the exception of clauses involving aeronautic expedition as expressive of the activity,' 71 if the
exclusion contains an additional as passenger or otherwise phrase,
7 2
the casual passenger will also be covered.
(To be concluded)
167. Adopting the strict construction theory of the numerous engage and
participatecases (see snpra note 21), ample authority for identical construction
of the two words is to be found even in dictionary definitions. Webster's, New
International Dictionary (1932) defines both words as meaning "to take part."
See Bern v. Travelers Ins. Co., note 32, as to "pre-occupation" interpretation.
168. See pp. 330-332 Benefit Ass'n. By. Employees v. Hayden, note 53;
Price v. Prud. Ins. Co. of Amer., note 77; Gits v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., note 66;
Mo. State v. Martin, note 66; Goldsmith v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., note 72; Mayer
v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., note 72; Gregory v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., note 35.
169. See petition for certiorari to U. S. Sup. Ct. in Gregory v. Mutual Life
Ins. Go., note 35, p. 2 (Cert. denied),
170. Gregory v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., note 35, 78 F. (2d) at 523: "One who
rides the plane for the sole purpose of going some place, of being transported
by it as a passenger, is not, we think, in the absence of words requiring such
construction, participating in aeronautics. He does not belong to the same craft
or class as those skilled artisans who participate in the construction, management, or operation of the airplane" (italics are the author's).
171. See Day v. Eq. Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., note 79.
172. See Mayer v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., note 72, 74 F. (2d) at 119: "But
the addition of the words as passenger or otherwise makes the phrase (engaging
in aeronautic operations) all-inclusive. It covers every one, whether an airplane
employee, pilot, mechanic, or executive, whether a fare-paying passenger or one
traveling on a pass or under a license, whose death results from his presence on
a plane at the time of the accident" (italics are the author's).

